This year marks the 50th anniversary of internal self-government in Jamaica. This month (July 4) is also the birthday of the leading Jamaican architect of constitutional advancement, Norman Manley.

Formal Cabinet government was granted to Jamaica in 1959. It meant that, constitutionally, the head of the majority party in the elected House would chair the Cabinet using the title of premier. This month (July 28) also marks the anniversary of the People's National Party's (PNP) victory in the general election allowing Manley to assume that title.

Although the economy and crime and violence remain leading concerns in Jamaica, the legacy of the constitutions of 1959 and 1962 requires us to rethink the rules and principles by which we govern ourselves. For example, the Constitution of 1962 fixed the number of constituencies at 60. We now believe the number should be increased to 63 and a constitutional change will be required for this to happen. The Constitution of 1962 established that only Jamaican and Commonwealth citizens could be elected to Parliament. We are now thinking that a change might be needed there as well so that Jamaican citizens have this privilege first and foremost.

Can constitutional change help us to manage crime better? The Jamaica Constabulary Force Strategic Review believes the Police Service Commission (PSC) and the Police Civilian Oversight Authority (PCOA) should be merged, which would require a constitutional amendment. Peter Bunting, however, wants to go further. In his Sectoral State of the Nation address to Parliament last Tuesday, he proposed that the powers of the PSC and the PCOA be combined in a new police services authority and that the powers of the commissioner of police be increased to cover personnel and financial management.

Constitutional change

The Constitution is more a part of our lives than we imagine and we ignore it at our own peril. Constitutional change helps us to establish rules to manage our rights. The Charter of Rights being considered would include the right of the child to protection, the right of adults to vote and the right of all to a healthy environment.

Then there are the more long-standing issues such as ending our constitutional allegiance to the British monarchy. It seems antiquated that our Constitution says we should owe allegiance to Britain and that non-British and non-Commonwealth citizens who have allegiance to any other country should not serve in our Parliament. Furthermore, we chose to retain the British Privy Council as our final Court of Appeal when we now have our own option in the Caribbean Court of Justice.

We have outgrown our Constitution for some time now. Our electorate is much larger; new rights have evolved; older rights need stronger protection; public-sector management structures must cope with new realities like crime and violence; the Commonwealth is weaker; exclusive political loyalty to Britain makes no logical sense; and we have a stronger Caribbean identity upon which we can and should rest a shared sovereignty.

To keep pace with the new demands of governance, reforms have come to focus more on effective institutions than on constitutional laws. For example, since 2002, Jamaica has turned to legislation governing public-sector management and accountability, the role of the contractor general in public procurement, the creation of executive agencies, access to and freedom of information, and prevention of corruption. Bunting also recognises that the recommendation of the JCF Strategic Review would require constitutional change that might take 'considerable time'. His proposal is for a statutory body accompanied by the required legislative changes, at least in the short run.

It is rather ironic that the very Constitution that created the Cabinet, Cabinet Office and self-government has become stuck and now depends on the Cabinet Office to drive changes in governance to make constitutional government and self-government possible and viable, either because of lethargy or deadlock over constitutional reform. In an era when accountability, transparency and participation are key principles, attention has shifted from constitutional reform to reforms of governance.

The Constitution and Financial Administration Act (FAA) laid the foundation for something we talk a lot more about today - efficient management of public resources. But where the Constitution stops or cannot go, governance reforms pick up. So, the Cabinet Office has taken up responsibility for public-sector reform and executive agencies as means towards greater accountability and efficiency.

Since 1993, the Cabinet Office has grown in the responsibility it has for the public service, the business of the Cabinet, and the structure of ministries and agencies and the relationships between them.

Importance of constitutional reform

But there is still an important role for constitutional reform, for all the reasons and on all the issues mentioned above. In addition, we have to decide on a better balance between the powers of the executive and the legislature. The executive is too dominant over the legislature. An especially large executive of the kind we have now increases this dominance even more.

A stronger parliament is needed. Just as we have evolved a strong Cabinet Office, we might need a strong parliamentary office, separate from the executive. It would have responsibility for research, including the research that interns from the Department of Government at UWI provide. Without them, parliamentarians and their committees would have no research assistants.

But parliamentary business is also subject to the executive. What bills come, when they come, and with whatever notice (some overnight) are determined by the executive because of its control over the majority leader of House business. The mishandling of House business sometimes even annoys the speaker, confuses clerks of Parliament and angers the Opposition. It gives little time to prepare and has been known to cause walkouts rather than debate and vote on bills that the Opposition had little time to consider and could only offer bad advice.

The creation of such an office need not depend on immediate constitutional reform though it should eventually be entrenched. It would support the principle of balance of powers between executive and legislature to permit greater effectiveness on the part of the latter, especially in supporting its committee system. At present, the executive's control of the majority in Parliament, of the leader of House business of the majority party, and the speaker of the House who has Cabinet status are the key mechanisms for the executive to control Parliament.

Greater accountability

Constitutional reform could also separate politicians from the award of contracts and provide greater accountability for the use of finances in political campaigns, all burning issues in this era of 'buy elections'.

Norman Manley would have been very disappointed in the fact that since 1995, a Constitutional Reform Commission proposed 29 amendments or revisions to the Constitution that have still not been acted upon. David Coore and Edward Seaga subsequently pared this number down to 16 amendments that could be prepared for legislation. The most recent attempt to get down to the 'doable' amendments was made in 2006 by these gentlemen, Lloyd Barnett and Shirley Miller. There is still no movement. We have nothing over which to celebrate this 50th anniversary of a self-governing Constitution. That says much about how we govern ourselves.

Robert Buddan lectures in the Department of Government, UWI, Mona. Email: Robert.Buddan@uwimona.edu.jm or columns@gleanerjm.com.