The following is the second part of an excerpt from the 2009 GraceKennedy Foundation Public Lecture Series presented by Anthony Harriott, professor of political sociology in the Department of Government at the University of the West Indies, Mona.

The realities of a subculture of violence and a system of violence mean violence control is a difficult project that requires a sustained effort. I have argued that if we begin to work systematically at it, it is possible in 20-30 years we should be able to bring these problems under control and to return Jamaica to what we may call a normal crime problem.

As Francis Bacon noted centuries ago: "In all things, and especially in the most difficult ones, we cannot expect one to concomitantly sow and reap the harvest." It is difficult to ask the citizens of Jamaica not to expect and demand instant results. Some 1,500 lives are being lost every year. Twenty to 30 years is, therefore, a long wait for the harvest. I do not make the point that control is a long-term project as a means of deflecting attention from the immediacy of the situation. On the contrary, I think this point emphasises the extraordinary character of the present situation. Urgent, carefully thought through consensus measures to achieve short-term control goals is necessary.

The medium-to long-term goal of policy should be to have a normal crime problem, that is, one that is normal in statistical terms. In most countries of the world the incidence of violent crime is much lower than that of property crime. Jamaica's pattern is abnormal because of the disproportionately high incidence of violence. A normal pattern of crime is one where the structure of criminal offending becomes similar to that of most countries in the world, that is, the number of incidents of violent crime does not exceed the number of property crimes.

A normal pattern should be achieved by reducing the level of violence to a normal rate. A normal rate of violent crime and of homicide would be no more than 25 per cent above the global mean. In my judgment, this latter objective is what may be achievable in 20 to 30 years. We must, however, have more immediate and intermediate goals that are strategy-defining. We may consider three markers or stages in the process of turning around the crime problem.

controlled crime

The first goal should be to get violent crime under control. This means preventing any further increase in the rate of violent crime and any further empowerment of criminal groups. Violence reduction should not be determined by criminal groups and should not involve paying them to suspend the violence. To the extent that this is done, its outcome is a false security. Violence control and prevention is achievable by making the existing response mechanisms more efficient and effective.

The second goal should be to reduce the levels of violence so that the structure of criminal offending approximates the Caribbean norm, that is, a ratio of no more than one incident of violent crime to two incidents of property crime. At this point, Jamaica's homicide rate and its rate of violent crime should also approximate the Caribbean mean. This requires significant changes in policing, reform of the larger criminal justice system and crime-prevention programmes that are focussed on high-violence communities.

VIOLENT CRIME REDUCTION

At the third stage, the objective should be to reduce the level of violent crime to within 25 per cent of the global mean. This would mean reducing the homicide rate to five times less than what it is now. In my judgment, fairly fundamental changes in how the institutions of the criminal justice system operates, in the relationship between criminal networks and the political organisations, and improvements in the economy and better integration of the communities of the urban poor, are required in order to achieve this outcome.

Setting goals in this way is useful as achievable markers but, more important, they should also serve to inform strategy. For example, achieving stage one may require a somewhat different approach or emphasis than that which is appropriate for stage two.

If we take the debate about the relative importance of law enforcement and social interventions and view it in terms of the above goals, we may ask which is more important at each stage.

DETAILED UNDERSTANDING

The answer may be that law enforcement is more important at stage one, and that the need for social crime prevention increases in importance and is likely to be more effective once we enter stage two. The debate thus becomes less general and forces a more detailed understanding of the problem. I will return to this issue.

If having an extraordinary crime problem is difficult, an even greater problem is when a country does not have the institutional capacity to respond to it effectively. Even more difficult is when the country has neither the capacity nor the collective will to make the changes that are necessary in order to effectively respond. I believe Jamaica is in this latter situation and has been for some time. Elsewhere, I have tried to explain the first problem, that is, the character of the crime problem.

The focus of this lecture is to try to better estimate and explain the response problems. Weak civic and political will is underpinned by problems of the social structure, crime dependency and a destructively competitive politics that puts party interests above national interests. The deep social divisions and distrust make social consensus difficult.

Political competitiveness between self-interested parties and distrust of state institutions make political consensus difficult. Moreover, the emergence of illegal opportunity structures that provide economic and other material benefits to communities and society has resulted in greater ambivalence towards some categories of crime. In this lecture we explore some of these issues. However, the main thrust is simply to critically evaluate the perspective on how best to respond to the crime problem.

I will not attempt to provide a list of recommendations that consists of 101 concrete short-term measures that the Government should pursue. They already have a list of 1001 such measures and we have demanded implementation without a critical examination of many of these proposals from the various reports that have been done.

concrete suggestions

To the extent that I make any concrete suggestions, these should be taken as being simply illustrative of the larger policy approaches that have been taken and/or as examples that are intended to provoke new thinking and to show other possibilities. These are not demands on anyone. I will also exclude the issue of implementation and its politics. This is a vital issue but I could not do it justice here.

Existing policies and institutions are failing to adequately respond to the twin challenges of organised crime and the emergence of a subculture of violence. Here it is argued that policy is not sufficiently aligned with the character and sources of the problems and the response capabilities of the state institutions.

An examination of the spatial distribution of violent crime in Jamaica will reveal a pattern of concentration in the communities of the urban poor. It will almost perfectly overlay the patterns of urban social exclusion. Some categories of crime are conditioned, however, not just by a deficit of legitimate opportunities but also by access to illegitimate opportunities and a supportingenvironment.

state response

The response of the state has been largely a state disciplinary one. This is an important aspect of any response. The state, however, does not have the disciplinary power, the capacity or the moral authority (categories that link state to society) to independently control the problem.

Improved disciplinary power and authority may be more effective if it is based on a coupling of legal or formal state control with informal social control or the power of the citizen - so that both are mutually reinforcing socially constructive linking of both may require the transformation of elements of the criminal justice system including new styles of law enforcement, changes in the architecture of the system and power relationships with the public, and better integrating the communities of the urban poor. These are the twin transformational challenges.