There was always a dull inevitability to it. Days after Iran's presidential election, when the country's supreme leader threw his full support behind Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, it all stopped being a matter of whether, and became one of when. Having invested the regime's legitimacy in the controversial re-election of the president, there would be no turning back. Sooner or later, the protests would either end, or they would be terminated.

There has been a bit of both. Despite the defiance of the opposition, gloom gradually set in. The government then tipped the balance by deploying a good portion of its imposing repressive capacity to crush the street protests. But despite its best efforts to suppress media coverage, the stream of video feeds from mobile telephones sent news of the crackdown around the world, and from there, back into Iran.

The clampdown on the opposition may not mean that Iran's government is out of the woods, or that the opposition's upsurge left no marks on the regime. There is evidence that the regime was shaken. This may have regional consequences.

Iran's theocracy is an unwieldy blend of republican democracy with religious authoritarianism. The president and legislature are elected. However, ultimate authority rests with the supreme leader, a Muslim cleric who is selected by his peers in a process more reminiscent of a papal election.

Successor

Upon the death of the Islamic Republic's founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the cleric elite settled on Ali Khamenei as a successor. Regarded by his peers as a relatively weak scholar, Ayatollah Khamenei consolidated his authority by building up the country's security apparatus, which reports directly to him.

This apparatus - army, Republican Guards, police and volunteer militias - enabled him to stave off the threat to the regime's authority these last few weeks. However, the supreme leader's growing dependence upon it may have weakened the hold of the clerical elite on the Islamic Republic. Inadvertently or not, the Ayatollah may have made Iran more of a police state.

The country's image in the region, as a religiously pure state, has taken a beating. Images of young men assaulting middle-aged female protesters these last few weeks have only reinforced the perception that Iran may not have quite the 'mandate of heaven' it claims to.

Internal matters may preoccupy the Iranian government for the time being. As a result, the country's regional allies - Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas - may feel a little neglected; they may even want to put just a little distance between themselves and Tehran.

Vindicated

Meanwhile, the Shiite leadership in Iraq, already quietist in its approach to politics, feels vindicated by events in Iran. The fears once entertained in western capitals, that Iran might use its influence over its co-religionists to influence Iraqi affairs, will be dispelled somewhat.

On the other hand, it is also possible that Tehran will respond to domestic weakness by becoming more bellicose in the region. But this could be risky for the government. The Obama administration's somewhat patient approach to the Iran protests - it condemned the crackdown, but didn't engage in Bush-like calls for regime change - make it harder for the Iranian government to portray the US as the region's big bully. A harder line on Iran may now be a bit easier for the US to get past its allies.

So while it failed to unseat the Government, the Iranian opposition appears to have weakened it considerably. In the short term, this victory may prove Pyrrhic: the regime may become more repressive. But unless the Ahmedinejad government shores up its domestic support - which will most likely necessitate economic reform - it may find itself ever more dependent on its security forces.

John Rapley is president of the Caribbean Policy Research Institute (CaPRI) an independent think tank affiliated to the UWI, Mona. Feedback may be sent to columns@gleanerjm.com